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SECRET

NNNNVV ZSP003BBA452
OO RUQMER
DE RUHBC #4166/1 2132316
ZNY 35555 ZZH
O 012240Z AUG 78
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUHNA/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 8392
INFO: PUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 5122
RUQMER/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 5766
RUSPOD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 6928
RUSBAL/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 2210
RUQMER/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 4264
BT
SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 STATE 194166/1

ACTION:
POLJ

INFO:
AMB
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ICA
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LIMDIS

Z.O. 11652: X-GDS

TAGS: PEPR, SA, IN, IR, AF, US

SUBJECT: UNDER SECRETARY NEWSOM'S TRIP TO SOUTHERN ASIA

MISSION MAY DRAW ORALLY ON FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING UNDER SECRETARY NEWSOM'S JULY 8-19 TRIP TO SOUTHERN ASIA IN POLADS AUGUST 2:

1.A. AFGHANISTAN: AFGHAN OFFICIALS EXPRESSED THEIR DESIRE FOR FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES AND EMPHASIZED THEIR POLICY OF NON-ALIGNMENT. THEY SAID THAT THEY WERE REVIEWING VARIOUS ISSUES SUCH AS THE FRONTIERS WITH PAKISTAN AND THE WATER AGREEMENT WITH IRAN AND HAD NOT YET DETERMINED THEIR POLICIES. THEY STATED THAT WHATEVER DECISIONS THEY HOPED TO RESOLVE ISSUES WITH THEIR NEIGHBORS THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS.

2.A. INTERNAL MATTERS. THEY SAID THEY WOULD BE DRAWING UP A FIVE YEAR PLAN AND THAT THEIR FIRST PRIORITY WOULD BE LAND REFORM. THEY SAID THEY FAVORED COOPERATIVES OVER COLLECTIVES.

3.A. WHILE THERE IS GENERAL IMPRESSION AROUND WESTERN EMBASSIES IN KABUL THAT THE NUMBER OF SOVIET ADVISERS IS INCREASING, THIS WAS NOT MENTIONED BY AFGHAN OFFICIALS. ALTHOUGH AFGHANS POINTED OUT THAT AFGHANISTAN HAD HAD GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION FOR SIXTY YEARS AND LOOKED FORWARD TO SUBSTANTIAL HELP FROM THE SOVIET UNION. THEY HOPED TO GET SUBSTANTIAL HELP FROM OTHERS AS WELL.

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D. WE DO NOT DISCOUNT THE POSSIBILITY THAT SOVIET INFLUENCE MAY INCREASE BUT BELIEVE THE OVERTURES FROM THE NEW GOVERNMENT FOR FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND ASSISTANCE SHOULD BE RESPONDED TO POSITIVELY. THE US WILL BE CONTINUING ITS PRESENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS IN AFGHANISTAN.

E. AT THE SAME TIME, THE SITUATION SHOULD BE REVIEWED BY THE US IF ITS PROGRAMS AND PERSONNEL ARE NOT GIVEN TREATMENT AND ACCESS COMPARABLE TO THOSE OF OTHER DONORS IF THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT DEPARTS FROM GENUINE NON-ALIGNMENT OR UNDERTAKES POLICIES WHICH CREATE PROBLEMS WITH PAKISTAN AND IRAN.

F. PAKISTAN, IRAN, AND SAUDI ARABIA ARE CONCERNED BY INCREASED SOVIET INFLUENCE IN AFGHANISTAN, BUT BELIEVE WESTERN COUNTRIES SHOULD CONTINUE PRESENCE THERE AND THAT COUNTRIES IN REGION SHOULD AVOID PROVOCATIVE ACTIONS WHICH COULD PUSH AFGHANS INTO GREATER DEPENDENCY ON SOVIETS. INDIANS TAKE MORE RELAXED VIEW, ALTHOUGH THEY ARE NOT HAPPY ABOUT INCREASED SOVIET INFLUENCE IN KABUL AND POSSIBILITY OF INCREASED INSTABILITY ALONG AFGHAN-PAKISTAN BORDER.

G. A. PAKISTAN: CONVERSATIONS WITH PAKISTANI OFFICIALS INDICATED THAT THEY ARE PERSUADED THAT THE SOVIET UNION NOW CONTROLS AFGHANISTAN AND THEY FEEL EXTREMELY EXPOSED AS A RESULT. THE PAKISTANIS ALSO REMAIN DEEPLY SUSPICIOUS OF INDIA, AND RESERVED TOWARD IRAN. THEY ARE LOSING CONFIDENCE IN THE WEST AND CENTO. GIVEN THESE FACTORS, THE PAKISTANIS ARE IN THE PROCESS OF REVIEWING THEIR POLICIES, INCLUDING LOOKING AT A POSSIBLE ACCOMMODATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND OBSERVER STATUS IN THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT. THEY SUGGESTED THEY ARE EXAMINING SUCH OPTIONS AS LEAVING CENTO IN ORDER TO REDUCE PRESSURES FROM THE SOVIET UNION. BUT NEWSOMAS ASSURED BY GEN. ZIA THAT PAKISTAN WOULD NOT TAKE ANY PRECIPITATE ACTION.

H. ON NUCLEAR REPROCESSING ISSUE, PAKISTANIS INDICATED RELUCTANCE TO GIVE UP IDEA OF NUCLEAR REPROCESSING PLANT DESPITE OUR URGING THAT, IN LIGHT OF CHANGED AFGHAN CIRCUMSTANCES, PAKISTAN'S OWN POSITION MIGHT BE DIFFERENT AND IRA. IF THE REPROCESSING ISSUE IS RESOLVED, WE CAN GET ON LINE PREVIOUS ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS. ZIA GOVERNMENT DOES NOT FEEL IT HAS SUFFICIENT POLITICAL STRENGTH TO COUNTER BRITAIN'S ORIGINAL DECISION TO ACQUIRE A REPROCESSING CAPABILITY.

3. SAUDI ARABIA/YEMENS: SAUDI OFFICIALS CONVEYED DEEP CONCERN OVER THE RECENT COUP IN ADEN WHICH THEY PERCEIVE AS FURTHER EVIDENCE OF A SOVIET EFFORT TO ENCIRCLE THEIR OIL-RICH PENINSULA WITH REGIMES HOSTILE TO MODERATE GOVERNMENTS. THEY EXPRESSED PARTICULAR CONCERN OVER WHAT THEY BELIEVE TO BE AN INFILTRATION OF FOREIGN TROOPS INTO THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN FOLLOWING THE COUP. WE COMPLEMENTED THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT FOR ITS ROLE IN JULY 2 ARAB LEAGUE MEETING WHICH RESULTED IN A CONDEMNATION BY A MAJORITY OF LEAGUE MEMBERS OF PDRT'S ROLE IN THE ASSASSINATION OF NORTH YEMEN PRESIDENT GHASANI AND FURTHER POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ISOLATION OF THE ADAMI REGIME. WE ARE ALSO WORKING WITH THE SAU
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RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 2211
RUQRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 4265
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S E C R E T FINAL SECTION OF 2 STATE 194166/2

LIMITS

TO ACCELERATE DELIVERY OF ALREADY APPROVED US MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO NORTH YEMEN AND DO NOT INTEND TO RESPOND AT THIS TIME TO ANY PDRT INTEREST IN IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH US.

VANCE
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